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I. INTRODUCTION
More so than at any time in this nation's past,
ordinary people are investing, directly or indirectly, in the
capital markets. ' Saving and investing are now important,
everyday tasks for which they are responsible, but for
which they may not be adequately educated. Therefore, the
educational implications of any securities regulation
affecting the ordinary investor must be carefully
considered.
If investor education becomes an important area for
securities regulators generally, it must naturally receive
even more attention from mutual fund2 regulators. In the
recent past, investments by Americans in mutual funds
have grown exponentially as mutual funds have become
the investment of choice both in retirement and non-
* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director, Center for the
Study of International Business Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank
Dean Joan Wexler and Brooklyn Law School for a summer stipend that
supported my writing of this Article. I would also like to thank Professor
Donald Langevoort and Craig S. Tyle for their review of an earlier draft
of this article.
ISee NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1997 57
(1998) (discussing growth of individual stock ownership in America and
noting that "one adult in every three owns corporate stock directly,
indirectly through a stock mutual fund, or through shares that are held
in a corporate thrift plan or defined contribution pension plan");
Edward Wyatt, Share of Wealth in Stock Holdings Hits 50-Year High,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at Al (citing data of Federal Reserve
indicating that Americans have more assets invested in stock market,
as compared to other assets considered part of household wealth, than
at any time in last 50 years).
2 For simplicity's sake, my reference to mutual funds in this Article is
to what are termed "open-end" management companies that sell
redeemable fund shares. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (1996). As a result
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the "Commission")
regulatory initiative discussed below, mutual fund shares may now be
offered in a new document.
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retirement accounts (employer-sponsored or IRAs).3 This
growth is not surprising, because mutual funds provide
consumers with investment options and access to
professional money managers that would otherwise be
available only to the wealthy. Astute mutual fund investing
can enable an ordinary investor to build the kind of
optimal portfolio that basic finance suggests is critical to
wealth enhancement (that is, a diversified portfolio with an
asset allocation among investments with different risks
that changes over the life cycle).4 Because of the popularity
of mutual funds for consumer investing, securities
regulators need to consider how mutual fund companies
should educate investors to understand the advantages of
mutual fund investing and the benefits of particular kinds
of funds and fund investment strategies, and to
comprehend fund disclosure. 5
3 See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1998 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 1
(1998) (describing growth in total assets in mutual funds from $1.07
trillion in 1990 to $4.5 trillion in 1997). Moreover, the number of
mutual funds has more than doubled since 1990, see id. at 16, and
approximately 16% of the $6.6 trillion of total retirement assets at year-
end 1996 was invested in mutual funds. Id. at 44.
4 See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 400-21
(6th ed. 1996) (providing basic explanation of life-cycle investing with
differing asset allocations depending upon life stage).
5 This emphasis on investor education should be no surprise to the
mutual fund industry and its regulators. Designed to serve the small
investor who may invest on his or her own, the industry has always
realized that investors need understandable descriptions of funds and
the benefits of fund investing in order to encourage them to invest
initially in mutual funds and to remain invested in them. Fund
companies have thus experimented with ways of communicating to
investors about issues that could be characterized as educational, such
as the basics of saving and investing. See infra note 25. Similarly,
because its regulated industry markets a product to ordinary investors,
the Division of Investment Management of the SEC has likely been more
sensitive than other divisions to issues of effective communication to
investors and their ability to understand securities disclosure.
The SEC has standardized and simplified mutual fund disclosure
because it recognized that fund investments were mainly designed for
ordinary investors. See, e.g., Registration Form Used by Open-End
Management Investment Companies; Guidelines, Investment Company
Act Release No. 13,436, 48 Fed. Reg. 37,928 (1983) (adopting two-tier
disclosure format for mutual fund registration with prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information); Consolidated Disclosure of
Mutual Fund Expenses, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,244,
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This Article examines the educational implications of a
new mutual fund disclosure format recently approved by
the SEC6 that allows fund companies to market their funds
by a summary document known as a "profile." 7 Both the
profile and significantly revised prospectus disclosure
were part of a larger SEC project to improve overall fund
disclosure and promote "effective communication" to fund
53 Fed. Reg. 3,192 (1988) (adopting uniform fee table in funds);
Advertising by Investment Companies, Investment Company Act
Release No. 16,245, 53 Fed. Reg. 3,868 (1988) (adopting uniform
formula for calculating fund performance); Disclosure of Mutual Fund
Performance and Portfolio Managers, Investment Company Act Release
No. 19,382, 58 Fed. Reg. 19,050 (1993) (adopting uniform presentation
of management's discussion of fund performance); Money Market Fund
Prospectuses, Investment Company Act Release No. 21,216, 60 Fed.
Reg. 38,454 (proposed July 26, 1995) (proposing amendments to
simplify money market-fund disclosure).
6The following discussion admittedly highlights only one aspect of the
educational issue regarding securities regulation, and only this
regulation's effect on education regarding mutual funds, because it
concentrates on education that mutual fund companies provide directly
to investors. Yet many ordinary investors, including investors in mutual
funds, invest through or with the guidance of brokers and/or financial
planners. There may well be a need to place educational responsibilities
on such professionals to reach those investors who have no direct
contact with the fund companies. See, e.g., SECURITIES INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION, INVESTOR EDUCATION HANDBOOK 6 (Nov. 1996) (encouraging
financial firms to have their employees conduct more education of
investors to respond to such investors' need and desire for education).
Moreover, a more troubling issue is the adequacy (or even accuracy) of
education conducted by "interested" parties, whether fund companies
or brokers, and the possible need for "neutral" (or at least non-financial
industry) education providers. See generally James A. Fanto, We're All
Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and Regulation of
Investor Education, 49 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999)
(discussing how competition in education services, both by for-profit
and nonprofit firms, has produced a standardized educational product
and how financial market regulators generally provide some basic
investor education and oversee market efforts).
7 See New Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7,513, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,968
(1998) [hereinafter, Final Profile Release] (authorizing fund profile that
presents summary of key information about fund): Proposed New
Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 7,399, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (proposed Mar.
10, 1997) [hereinafter, Profile Proposal](proposing fund profile).
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investors. 8 The Article argues that the profile initiative, as
part of the larger regulatory undertaking, is educational in
nature primarily because, by focusing investors' attention
on certain basic fund features and their comparability with
those of other funds,9 the new format in effect invites them
to think about the kind of issues that investor education
identifies as central to optimal investing. That is, requiring
fund companies to put information into a format to which
investors can easily apply saving and investing education
encourages investors to recognize their need for this
education.
This Article initially summarizes briefly the reasons for
the importance of investor education in the United States
and the need for U.S. securities regulators to examine
their consumer-oriented regulations, particularly affecting
mutual funds, from an educational perspective. In this
connection, it refers to the large number of investor
educational products and services developed and provided
by fund companies, nonprofit organizations and even
government regulators. It next identifies the educational
importance of the profile within the overall educational
orientation of the revised fund disclosure initiative.
Finally, it argues that the SEC should now take a further
regulatory step to make explicit the educational
8 In effect, the revisions went to the entire fund registration
statement, the Form N- IA, although key amendments altered the
prospectus part of this statement. See Registration Form Used by Open-
End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No.
7,512, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,916 (1998) [hereinafter, Final Registration
Release] (stating that amendments are intended to improve fund
prospectus disclosure); Registration Form Used by Open-End
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7,398,
62 Fed. Reg. 10,898 (proposed Mar. 10, 1997) [hereinafter, Registration
Proposal] (same). This disclosure initiative also included a proposal
regulating investment company names. See Investment Company
Names, Investment Company Release No. 22,530, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,955(proposed Mar. 10, 1997) [hereinafter, Names Proposal]. The SEC has
not yet taken final action on this proposal.
9 See Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,917 (observing
that the two major disclosure initiatives are "intended to: improve fund
disclosure by requiring prospectuses to focus on information central to
investment decisions; provide new disclosure options for investors; and
enhance the comparability of information about funds").
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implications of the profile by allowing, even requiring, fund
companies explicitly to link the profile to their's and
others' educational materials-thus alerting ordinary
investors to the existence and importance of these
materials.
II. THE NEED FOR INVESTOR EDUCATION
The importance of and need for investor education
basically arises because saving and investing have
increasingly become ordinary activities in the United
States (and much of the developed world)'0 that are as
essential for survival in society as finding lodging and a
job. This situation has emerged in the last two decades
and owes much to the increased use by employers of
defined contribution plans" that place upon the individual
0 In another paper, I examine how investor education is becoming
important in other countries for reasons similar to those explaining its
growing significance in the United States, as outlined below. See James
A. Fanto, Comparative Investor Education, BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming
1999). See also GROUP OF TEN, THE MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF AGEING POPULATIONS (Apr. 1998) (discussing effects of
increased longevity and declining fertility on pension systems in
developed countries and possible need for funded, including
individually funded, pensions). One example of the international
significance of this subject is a recent SEC investor education campaign
coordinated with countries in the Western Hemisphere. See Overview:
Get the facts. It's your money. It's your future., (visited Oct. 6, 1998)
<http://www. sec. gov/consumer/cosra/about/facts.htm> (describing
campaign and participation by securities regulators in twenty-one
countries in Western Hemisphere).
" See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: MOST
EMPLOYERS THAT OFFER PENSIONS USE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 4-9
(GAO/GGD-97- 1, Oct. 3, 1996) (presenting growth statistics for defined
contribution plans); Olivia S. Mitchell, et al., Introduction: Assessing the
Challenges to the Pension System, in POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 2-6 (Michael S. Gordon, et al., eds., 1997)
(explaining shift to defined contribution plans). In the defined
contribution plan, an individual sets aside a portion of his or her
earnings in an account and may receive an additional contribution to it
from the employer, and he or she must decide how to invest the funds
within a limited number of options provided by the plan. See EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
PROGRAMS 57-59, 70-72 (5th ed. 1997) (describing different types of
defined contribution plans, including savings or thrift plans, profit-
sharing plans, money purchase pension plans, employee stock
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employee most of the responsibility for saving and
investing for his or her retirement, at the expense of the
defined benefit retirement programs 12 where an employer
basically assumes this responsibility. Different
explanations, ranging from the cost of defined benefit
programs to the compatibility of defined contribution
plans with the needs of an increasingly transient
workforce, account for this shift. 13 Whatever one's view of
ownership plans and 401(k) arrangements); see also U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: PLAN FEATURES PROVIDED BY
EMPLOYERS THAT SPONSOR ONLY DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 11-18
(GAO/GCD-98-23, Dec. 1, 1997) (describing contribution features of
subset of defined contribution plans). In one well-known type of defined
contribution plan pursuant to Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue
Code, an employee can defer, on a pre-tax basis, a portion of his or her
compensation as a contribution to an individual retirement account
and receive a matching contribution from an employer (generally, a
percentage of an employee's earnings), at the employer's option. For an
employer to receive certain benefits of such plans (chiefly, a limitation
on its fiduciary liability with respect to the plan), applicable regulations
stipulate that it must offer plan participants at least three investment
alternatives that are each diversified and with different risk/return
features. See generally Gordon P. Goodfellow & Sylvester J. Schieber,
Investment of Assets in Self-Directed Retirement Plans, in POSITIONING
PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 67, 70-71 (Michael S. Gordon, et
al., eds., 1997).
12 See generally EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 11,
at 69-70 (explaining that in "defined benefit" plans, employer provides
employee with pension calculated in accordance with set formula,
usually based upon years of service and percentage of pay). Defined
benefit plans use different formulae: some pay a flat-dollar amount for
each eligible year of service; others use a percentage of pay for each
eligible year or a percentage of career-average pay; still others calculate
benefits as a percentage of average pay in the final employment years.
See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAw 44 (2d ed. 1995). They are all designed to ensure that an employee
works a set number of years before becoming eligible for (or "vesting" in)
the plan. Although complicated, the vesting rules generally require a
plan to vest an employee fully after either five or seven years of
employment. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 11,
at 42-43 (noting that once vested, employee's rights generally cannot be
revoked).
13 See Kelly Olsen & Jack VanDerhei, Defined Contribution Plan
Dominance Grows Across Sectors and Employer Sizes, While Mega
Defined Benefit Plans Remain Strong: Where We Are and Where We Are
Going, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE SPECIAL REPORT
SR-33/ISSUE BRIEF NO. 190, Oct. 1997, at 13-14 (discussing costs of
defined benefit plans, which include not only the actuarial help to
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this transformation, it has clearly begun to focus the
attention of ordinary individuals on saving and investing
(particularly capital market investing) because individual
investors are beginning to realize that their well-being in
retirement will depend upon how much they save now and
how well they invest their retirement funds.
Several other factors make individual saving and
investing an urgent matter. First, for many people
retirement may no longer be a brief period at the end of a
working life, but a time that can extend for years because
of decreases in mortality and that could thus demand
calculate the employer contributions needed to provide the agreed-upon
benefits for retirees, but also the premium paid to a government
retirement insurance fund (the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation)
to protect employees of companies that fail to fund their pension
liabilities). See also RICHARD A. IPPOLrrO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE, ANALYSIS, AND POLICY 85-89 (1997) (arguing that
the decline of defined benefit plans owes much to the popularity of
Section 401(k) plans, which are not so much cheaper for companies to
administer as they enable companies to key retirement benefits to
worker productivity); STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS
238-46 (1997) (discussing reorganization of big business and arguing
that defined contribution plans are more suitable in labor environment
where highly-educated employees "rent" their services to many different
companies over their working lives, which means that they could not
take full advantage of defined benefit plans because of vesting
requirements). The negative aspect of this shift is that the defined
benefit plans better protect an individual against the risk that he or she
will outlive his or her retirement resources in the actual retirement and
that he or she will not have the competence to save adequately in
retirement or have the market power to make the best investments. See,
e.g., E. PHILIP DAVIS, PENSION FUNDS: RETIREMENT-INCOME SECURITY, AND
CAPITAL MARKETS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 23 (1995). Yet defined
contribution plans avoid any unfairness of the defined benefit plans due
to the latter's redistributive nature and enable an investor to capture
the upside of investment growth and avoid cumbersome eligibility
requirements. See RICHARD DISNEY, CAN WE AFFORD TO GROW OLDER? A
PERSPECTIVE ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 111-21 (1996) (explaining that,
in defined benefit plans, older workers benefit at expense of others
because they are given early retirement, which typically requires more
contributions from younger workers); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees,
Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1519,
1539-40 (1997) (observing that employers providing defined benefit
plans captured most of the 350% gain in pension fund assets from 1980
to 1995 because their pension obligations to employees were fixed).
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considerable resources.14 Second, the main federal
retirement program, Social Security, which is really a
"pay-as-you-go system" where present workers pay
benefits for current retirees, has potential funding
difficulties and, in any event, cannot support an adequate
retirement for most people. 15 Indeed, many policy
discussions and legislative proposals regarding Social
Security suggest replacing, partly or entirely, its current
defined benefit with a defined contribution approach, that
is, allowing at least some of an individual's contributions
to be placed in an individualized account subject to his or
her own limited investment decision-making, rather than
to be used to pay the Social Security benefits of current
retirees. 16
14See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RETIREMENT INCOME:
IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION
REFORM 17 (GAO/HEHS-97-81, July 11, 1997) [hereinafter, GAO
RETIREMENT INCOME] (providing chart showing steady longevity increase
since 1940 and projected increase in future).
h5 See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY:
DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY 12-20(GAO/HEHS-98-33, July 22, 1998) (describing basic structure of
program and funding difficulties caused by lower fertility and increased
longevity of "Baby Boom" generation); GAO RETIREMENT INCOME, supra
note 14, at 40-41; Robert J. Myers, Will Social Security be Therefor Me?,
in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21sT CENTURY 208, 209-11 (Eric R. Kingson &
James H. Schulz eds., 1997) (summarizing various actuarial reports on
date of future deficit in Social Security funds). In the Social Security
program (officially, the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance(OASDI) program), present workers are taxed to pay for the benefits of
current retirees. See Myers supra, at 208. Social Security now collects
more than it pays out and has generated a surplus that is invested in,
and receives interest payments as, U.S. Treasury securities. Id. at 209.
Under current estimates, Social Security's surplus will rapidly fall in
2009 and disappear in 2012. Id. The federal government will then have
to begin repaying Social Security's loan to it to make up the shortfall.
Proceeds from this loan (also known as the Social Security trust funds)
will be used up in 2029. Id.
16 See, e.g., GAO RETIREMENT INCOME, supra note 14, at 29-41 (listing
possible solutions, such as reducing initial benefits, raising retirement
age, reducing cost-of-living adjustments, means-testing benefits,
increasing income taxes on Social Security benefits, increasing payroll
taxes, etc.); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING:
IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT STOCK INVESTING FOR THE TRUST FUND, THE
FEDERAL BUDGET, AND THE ECONOMY 4-6 (GAO/AIMD/HEHS-98-74, Apr.
22,1998) (discussing implications of shifting Social Security trust funds
from investing in government securities to stocks); NATIONAL COMM'N ON
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This development may, or may not be, for the best.
Many individuals may not be competent to plan
adequately about an issue that they experience once in
their lives. 17 And the literature on individual saving and
investing behavior (and on rationality in general) suggests
that there are many reasons, including psychological
factors, why individuals do not save and invest optimally. 18
Placing such an important issue as retirement planning on
individuals' shoulders could lead to significant disparities
in retirement income beyond those that naturally flow
from differences in pre-retirement income, kinds of jobs
and the generosity of an employer's pension plans.' 9 Yet,
as I argue elsewhere, 20 individual saving and investing
responsibility will exist in the United States primarily for
cultural reasons. The situation is not bleak, because, more
so than ever in the past, individuals have a wealth of
investment opportunities, primarily because of the
RETIREMENT POLICY, "THE 2 1ST CENTURY RETIREMENT SECURnIY PLAN" 2 (May
19, 1998) (summarizing its reform recommendations on Social Security,
which include having individual Social Security accounts with
individually-directed investments).
1 See Richard H. Thaler, Psychology and Savings Policies, 84 AM.
ECON. ASSN. PAPERS & PROC. 186, 187 (May 1994); see also U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR
ADDRESSING PROGRAM SOLVENCY 69 (GAO/HEHS-98-33, July 22, 1998)
("Under a privately managed system of individual accounts, individuals
or employers might contract directly with financial institutions. This
could mean a wide array of investment choices for individuals and, at
the same time, a wide variation in potential financial outcomes.").
18 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477-78 (1998) (discussing data
calling into question rationality of economic actors); Cass R. Sunstein,
The FuLture of Law and Economics: Looking Forward: Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1179-92 (1997) (outlining
psychological factors that can affect rationality), Thaler, supra note 17,
at 186-91 (arguing that psychological factors affect investors so that
they do not perform optimal life-cycle investing). See generally Matthew
Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 24-31 (Mar.
1998) (discussing evidence of biases in decision-making).
19That is, giving individuals saving and investing responsibility
cannot affect such issues as the enormous disparities in income arising
from kinds of employment. Other things being equal, however, it could
lead to differences in retirement income that depend upon the amount
saved and one's investment strategy.2 0 See Fanto, supra note 6.
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development of mutual funds. The major policy question,
therefore, is how to help ordinary people perform optimally
their saving and investing responsibilities. 2 1
Investor education, one of the central ways of so
helping ordinary investors, raises many issues, such as
the identity of its provider and the nature of its content.
Because this is not the place to explore these theoretical
questions,22 it is enough to observe that policy-makers in
fmancial services 23 are clearly focusing on investor
21 One problem with a narrow definition of investor education is that it
encourages investors to concentrate only on their portfolio and to ignore
"larger" social issues relating to company activity. Yet they must
acquire this basic financial education, which is critical to their social
survival, before progressing to education about "larger" corporate and
financial issues. See James A. Fanto, Investor Education, Securities
Disclosure and the Creation and Enforcement of Corporate Governance
and Firm Norms, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. (1998).
221 have outlined a theoretical model for the kinds and appropriate
providers of investor education. See Fanto, supra note 6. Economists,
most notably Douglas Bernheim, have investigated the efficacy of
investor education in different contexts. See, e.g., PATRICK J. BAYER, ET
AL., THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN THE WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE
FROM A SURVEY OF EMPLOYERS (National Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 5655, 1996) (discussing evidence from workplace
financial education); B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM, ET AL., EDUCATION AND
SAVING: THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF HIGH SCHOOL FINANCIAL CURRICULUM
MANDATES (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6085,
1997) (presenting empirical research on results of high school financial
education); B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM & DANIEL M. GARRETr, THE
DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUESCES OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION IN THE
WORKPLACE: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLDS (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5667, 1996) (presenting empirical
research on effects of workplace financial education).
23 Securities regulators cannot accomplish this task alone. For one
reason, they have no jurisdiction over the individual investing that
occurs through employer-sponsored defined contribution plans, which
the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration in the Department of
Labor oversees under the statutory structure of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)
(West Supp. 1998) (authorizing employer to provide defined
contribution individual account plan); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)
(1998) (Department of Labor's regulations providing that employer must
offer employee minimum of three diversified investment alternatives
with different risk and return characteristics). The applicable
regulations for such plans require that an employer supply information
about the investment alternatives so that employees can make an
informed decision, see 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-(c) (1998), and this
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education. A recent amendment to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), for
example, requires pension regulators and associated
financial market regulators to develop saving and
investing education, 24 and the SEC has promoted investor
education through the activities of its Office of Investor
Education and Assistance, such as the recent "Facts on
Saving and Investing Campaign."25 Those in the financial
services industry, and their friends, have not waited for
policy guidance to engage in investor education, but have
created numerous educational products and services in
information can come in the form of disclosure concerning a given
investment prepared in accordance with securities regulations. The aid
given to individual investors must come, therefore, from many sources,
including the government regulator having jurisdiction over the
particular kind of investing in question. See, e.g., Participant
Investment Education, Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, 29 C.F.R. §
2509.96-1(d) (1996) (establishing a "safe harbor" for four kinds of
information and education that employers, and particularly financial
firms operating the plans for them, can supply to employees without
triggering a fiduciary obligation to them (i.e., without being deemed to
be giving investment advice)).
24 See, e.g., Savings Are Vital to Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997 or
SAVER Act, which amended ERISA to provide outreach to promote
retirement income savings and a national summit on retirement
savings. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146-47 (West Supp. 1998). The SAVER Act
states that its purpose is:
(1) to advance the public's knowledge and understanding of
retirement savings and its critical importance to the future well-
being of American workers and their families; (2) to provide for a
periodic, bipartisan national retirement savings summit in
conjunction with the White House to elevate the issue of savings to
national prominence; and (3) to initiate the development of a broad-
based, public education program to encourage and enhance
individual commitment to a personal retirement savings strategy.
Savings Are Vital to Everyone's Retirement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-92, § 2, 111 Stat. 2139, 2139 (1997).25 See Overview: Get the facts. It's your money. It's your future.,
(visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/consumer/cosra/
about/facts.htm> (describing week-long, SEC-sponsored "Facts on
Saving and Investing Campaign" from March 29 to April 4, 1998 with
participation of other government agencies, state securities regulators,
consumer organizations and financial industry trade groups). Most
recently, the SEC has placed a "Financial Facts Toolkit" on its web site.
See Get the facts. It's your money. It's your future. Financial Facts Tool
Kit, (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/consumer/toolkit.htm>.
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response to investor demand and, as is most likely, as a
way to stimulate this demand. 26
Federal financial regulators clearly have a role in
investor education. This role involves participating in a
national campaign to help change the norms and behavior
of individuals regarding saving and investing27 and to
26 Sources of investor educational materials and services are simply
too numerous to list. Fund companies, brokers, trade organizations and
nonprofit organizations, among others, provide educational materials
and services through various media, including the World Wide Web.
See, e.g., Fidelity Investments: Know what you own and know why you
own it, (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.fidelity.com/planning/
investment> (providing investment educational materials about
importance of saving, particularly for retirement needs, elementary
finance, investments, tax-reducing retirement options, mutual funds,
investment basics and asset-allocation strategies); Mutual Fund
Connection, (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.ici.org> (providing
general educational materials explaining nature of mutual fund, its
risks and benefits (chiefly diversification), kinds of mutual funds,
typical fees, expenses and services of funds and pricing and redemption
of mutual fund shares); AARP Webplace, (visited Oct. 6, 1998)
<http://www.aarp.org> (web site of American Association of Retired
Persons with extensive educational materials); National Institute for
Consumer Education, (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.emich.edu/
public/coe/nice/nice.html> (including educational materials developed
with assistance of National Association of Securities Dealers, and
hypertext link to free or inexpensive sources of investor education). See
generally, Fanto, supra note 6 (discussing these private educational
materials and services).
27 See Fanto, supra note 6. Federal and state government officials
need to encourage improved saving and investing by ordinary
Americans, so that investing and saving become both optimal and
almost habitual. See Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The
Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, in RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL
ECONOMICS 91, 92-101 (1991) (describing usefulness of "habitual rules"
in enabling individuals to resist impulses, and explaining prominence of
"mental accounts," whereby individuals divide their income and assets
into various accounts, some of which are unavailable for current
consumption). See generally Assar Lindbeck. Incentives and Social
Norms in Household Behavior, 87 AMER. ECON. REv. 370, 375-76 (1997)
(discussing saving and consumption norms that "provide a third
important illustration of relations between economic incentives and
social norms in the context of household behavior"); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 338, 351 (1997) (defining "norms" as nonlegal obligations
arising within decentralized groups or at societal level); Richard A.
Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AMER.
ECON. REV. 365, 365 (1997) ("By 'social norm' ('norm' for short) I shall
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educate them on protecting themselves against financial
fraud. As part of this activity, they should also consider
how they could best work with private parties to develop
and deliver investor education.
III. THE EDUCATIONAL IMPORTANCE
OF THE PROFILE
The profile initiative, which essentially involves
allowing mutual fund companies to sell mutual funds by
means of an abbreviated prospectus or profile, raises
significant issues for fund companies and legal
practitioners in investment management. A central one
involves the liability implications of permitting a company
to use an abbreviated document, as opposed to the full
prospectus, to solicit interest in the fund. 28 This Article's
analysis of the profile, however, focuses only on its
implications for investor education. From this perspective,
the profile initiative first exemplifies how investor
education should involve a partnership between private
firms providing, and experimenting with the design of,
educational products and services and government
regulators who oversee and promote this activity. Second,
mean a rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a
court or a legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions, yet
is regularly complied with (otherwise it wouldn't be a rule).") (footnote
omitted).
28 The central concern is that a fund company would incur liability by
using a profile, which omits material information about the fund that
the full prospectus otherwise includes. The company could not rely on
the full prospectus in using the profile, because the profile does not
incorporate by reference the longer document. Although the profile is a
summary or "omitting" prospectus under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Act of 1933 that is exempt from the strict liability of Section 11 of the
Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1996), a company could incur liability for the
profile under Section 12(a)(2) of that Act or generally under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act. See generally
Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,970-13,972 (discussing
liability issues concerning profile); Profile Proposal, supra note 7, at
10,950 (same). The SEC believes that fund companies should not incur
increased liability for using a profile so long as a profile provides
material information (or does not omit such information) required by
the line items of the profile format. See Final Profile Release, supra note
7, at 13,971-13,972.
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the initiative shows, as a general matter, the increasing
link between securities disclosure and education because
of the renewed focus in securities regulation on effective
communication to the ordinary investor. Third and more
specifically, by raising key topics that should be on every
investor's mind, a profile presupposes on an investor's
part some investor training and invites the investor to
apply an educational framework to it.
The development of the profile exemplifies how the
private sector (a term used broadly to include both "for
profit" and nonprofit companies) has often taken the lead
in providing investor educational products and services to
the ordinary investor. Closer to the consumer than
government regulators and responding to the needs of
their customers, private firms pay attention to the
increased saving and investing responsibilities of ordinary
people and their confusion in the face of numerous
investment products and services. In particular, mutual
fund companies are well situated to observe that the
typical investor, whether inside or outside retirement
plans, "face[s] an increasingly difficult task in choosing
among different fund investments" 29 and has limited
financial sophistication or "literacy."30 They also realize
that, because many of these investors cannot understand,
and/or do not have the time to read, the lengthy,
financially and legally complex fund prospectuses, 31 they
increasingly look to simple comparisons, evaluations and
29 See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,968 (noting that "It]he
Commission, fund investors, and others have recognized the need to
improve fund disclosure documents to help investors evaluate and
compare funds.") (footnote omitted).3 0 See id. (discussing different types of investors). See generally, Henry
T. C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail
Mutual Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319,
2358-79 (1996) (observing that mutual fund disclosure laws
increasingly require discussion of attributes of class of investments to
which fund belongs (or in which it invests) and thus leads to issues of
investor "literacy").
31 See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,970 ("The Commission
and others, in seeking to identify ways to improve the disclosure of
information about mutual funds to investors, have collected data about
investors. This data demonstrates that different investors desire and
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ratings of funds offered by market services 32 or to the more
accessible materials supplementary to a prospectus, such
as sales literature and advertisements, supplied by fund
companies, to make an investment decision. 33 Accordingly,
in consultation with the SEC and the Investment
Companies Committee of the North American Securities
Administrators Association, the Investment Company
Institute (ICI) and eight fund companies developed
prototype shorter prospectuses or profiles and tested
consumer reaction to them. The tests showed that the
shorter documents were popular with consumers and that
led to the profile initiative. 4
The initiative also demonstrates that a primary focus
of securities regulation pertaining to consumer issues is
increasingly educational in nature because of an
enhanced concern for disclosure's "effective
communication" to ordinary investors. 35 If the inquiry is
whether disclosure is in fact reaching the ordinary
use different types and amounts of materials in determining whether to
invest in funds.") (footnote omitted).
32 See, e.g., The Kaufmann Fund: Morningstar.net, (visited Oct. 6,
1998) <http://www.momingstar.net> (web site of one well-known
mutual fund rating service).
33 See, e.g., Clifford E. Kirsch, et al., Mutual Fund and Variable
Insurance Products Performance Advertising, 50 Bus. LAw. 925, 933-35,
952-59 (1995) (summarizing advertising laws and regulations and
discussing problems with simplified fund prospectuses and fund
advertising); Paul S. Stevens & Craig S. Tyle, Mutual Funds, Investment
Advisers, and the National Securities Markets Improvement Act, 52 Bus.
LAW. 419, 425-27, 459-68 (1997) (discussing development of simplified
fund disclosure and advertising).
3 See Profile Proposal, supra note 7, at 10,944 (describing history of
experimentation with profiles by large fund companies); Final
Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,918 (same). See generally
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, THE PROFILE PROSPECTUS: AN ASSESSMENT
BY MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDERS (1996) (presenting research into
consumer attitudes regarding fund profiles to the SEC).
3 See, e.g., Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,917
(' Taken together, these initiatives [new fund prospectus format, profile,
etc.] are designed to promote more effective communication of
information about funds to investors without reducing the amount of
information provided to investors. The Proposed Amendments reflected
the Commission's strong belief that the primary purpose of the
disclosure in a fund's prospectus is to help an investor make a decision
about investing in the fund.") (footnote omitted).
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investor, one must improve both ends of the
communication process, the disclosure itself and the
comprehension abilities of the investor. The recent focus
on the ordinary investor has been a priority of the current
SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, who has championed such
investors in many initiatives, most notably in the "plain
English" regulation. 36 This emphasis (for it is only that) in
securities regulation is necessary as so many new
investors enter the securities markets and as the
possibilities for their individual investing, through the
World Wide Web or otherwise, multiply.37 Even if their
expertise traditionally has lain with regulating company
disclosure, securities regulators cannot ignore the
comprehension of individual investors, for, if it proves to
be inadequate, there could be adverse consequences in the
securities markets.38
36 Chairman Levitt has clearly been the catalyst for the SEC's
educational initiatives: in 1993 he established an Office of Investor
Education and Assistance and has conducted town meetings with
ordinary investors. See Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the
Senate Comm. On Government Affairs, 105th Cong., 1 st Sess. 18 (1997)
(statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Comm'n) (describing town meetings as "typically well-attended (often
over 1,000 investors attended each meeting) and featur[ing] a series of
seminars for investors on a wide variety of topics"). On the SEC "plain
English" initiative, see Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release
No. 7,497, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370 (1998) (establishing "plain English" rules
and principles for writing prospectus disclosure); Plain English
Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7,380, 62 Fed. Reg. 3152,
3155-59 (proposed Jan. 21, 1997) (discussing elements of plain English
in proposed rule). See generally Fanto, supra note 6.
37 See, e.g., Peter Galuszka, Guess Who's Courting the Beardstown
Ladies?, Bus. WK., Sept. 22, 1997, at 90 (discussing direct investment
movement and National Association of Investors Corporation which
encourages this movement and educates investors): Barbara Hetzer,
Direct Stock Buying: A Load of New No-Loads, Bus. WK., June 16, 1997,
at 152 (explaining that individual investors have increasing
opportunities to buy stock directly from public companies and thus
bypass brokers).
3 8 Cf., FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS, THE NEW FINANCE: REGULATION AND
FINANCIAL STABILrY 123-24 (1996) (describing concern that investors
could panic in market downturns and upset market structure). Of
course, during the high market volatility of recent months, all eyes have
rested on ordinary investors to see whether, in fact, they will panic and
bring about a market crash as some commentators have speculated.
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In its profile releases, the SEC affirms that the central
purpose of the profile is to ensure that funds are
communicating effectively to ordinary investors.3 9 The
profile initiative compels companies to present essential
information about themselves in a simple way so that an
investor who has little time and, even more importantly,
little investment sophistication can understand it.40 The
profile does this in an obvious way by encouraging fund
companies to use attractive graphic presentations and
charts, to avoid dense textual descriptions and thus to
make the profile an inviting document to read.4 1 A fund
can provide in the profile only nine items of information in
a set order (and several of these involve a chart or table
presentation)42 so that an ordinary investor receives only
limited, key information about a fund in a simplified
format. The final release invites fund companies to
experiment with presentation devices (such as, question-
and-answer format) that will further enhance the
comprehensibility of these items.43 Part of effective
communication involves access to profiles, and a fund
company can distribute them to consumers widely
39 See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,970 ("the Commission
encourages all funds that decide to use profiles to take the steps
necessary to ensure that their prospectuses effectively communicate
information to investors").
40 See id. ('The Commission's strongly held belief is that the principal
goal of fund disclosure, whether it takes the form of a long or short
document, should be to provide investors with useful and relevant
information.").
41 See id. at 13,985. A fund company must prepare a profile using the
"plain English" writing principles, as now incorporated at 17 C.F.R.
§421(d) (1998). See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at
13,969-13,970, 13,972.
42 See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,972.
43 In the rule proposal, the SEC would have required that a fund
present the items in a question-and-answer format that was popular
with consumers in focus groups who were the subjects of
experimentation with the profile. See Profile Proposal, supra note 7, at
10,945 (' The proposed question-and-answer format, frequently used by
many funds, is intended to help communicate the required information
effectively."). To allow for continued industry developments with profile
presentation, the SEC omitted this requirement from the final release,
but kept the requirement that the nine items be presented in a set
order. See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,972.
76 VILLANOVA JOURNAL OF LAW AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
through various media, including through mass mailing,
newspapers and electronic delivery. 44 In fact, the SEC
recognizes the suitability of the profile to the growing
Internet use by fund companies and fund customers
because a company can electronically provide a profile and
then "hypertext link" it to the full prospectus and other
information about the fund.45
The most important aspect of the profile initiative is the
way it encourages an investor to use whatever investor
education he or she has received. The central purpose of
investor education is to teach an investor the basics of
finance and investing so that he or she becomes part of the
investment "culture."46 This means that an investor must
learn about the basic kinds of investments (including
about the securities markets in which they trade and the
regulation of those markets) and investment professionals.
An investor must also learn to locate information about
investment performance (and acquire the ability to
understand the conventions of presentation of this
information).47 Even more importantly, he or she must
learn the relation of risk to return, the means of
minimizing or eliminating certain risks (such as, through
diversification) and some fundamentals about investing
44 See id. at 13,981.
45 See Profile Proposal, supra note 7, at 10,951 n.94 (noting that
profile is especially effective in Internet dissemination because of ability
to hyperlink to prospectus from profile). See also Final Profile Release,
supra note 7, at 13,980-13,981. On electronic delivery of disclosure
documents, see generally HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION
IN CYBERSPACE 2-1 to 3-42 (2nd ed., 1998). The profile initiative also
permits fund companies to tailor profiles used in employer-sponsored
retirement plans (such as those under Section 401(k)) to the plan's
needs and participant investment limitations. See Final Profile
Proposal, supra note 7, at 13,981-13,982 (permitting omission of
information relating to purchases and sales of fund shares, fund
distributions and tax consequences).
46 See Fanto, supra note 6.47 An example of this "standardized" investing education is in
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER EDUCATION, THE BASICS OF INVESTING: A
GUIDE FOR EDUCATORS, at Unit 2 ("How Financial Markets Work: Lesson
1-Types of Financial Markets"), Unit 3 ("Investment Choices: Lesson
2-Types of Savings and Investments") (1997) (also available at
<http://www.emich.edu>).
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strategy. In order to create an optimal portfolio, an
investor needs to know how to make a correct asset
allocation in line with his or her life stage and investment
goals (that is, life-cycle investing) and the way to choose
among comparable investments, taking into account such
factors as expenses and tax consequences.
4 s
The profile's content, which uses disclosure items from
the revised fund prospectus,49 gives investors the above
kinds of information. A fund profile must summarize the
fund's basic investment objectives and the general
strategies of its advisor for achieving them, such as, that
an equity fund adopts a "growth" approach and that it
attains this objective through purchases of securities of
companies with specific characteristics. 50 With such an
identification, an investor can consider whether an
investment in a fund is appropriate in light of his or her
portfolio objectives. A profile's risk disclosure requires a
fund to identify in general terms the specific risks to which
it is subject because of its portfolio, objectives and
strategies, as well as to provide a bar chart of annual total
returns over a ten-year period and a table indicating the
fund's average annual returns for one-, five- and ten-year
intervals.5 1 Such disclosure encourages an ordinary
48 See Fanto, supra note 6.
49 The profile would alert investors that they could obtain from the
company a full prospectus (which, in any event, would be sent to them
upon confirmation of purchase). See Final Profile Release, supra note 7,
at 13,969. See also Profile Proposal, supra note 7, at 10,944 ('The
profile would allow investors to choose the amount and format of
information they want before making an investment decision.").
5
°See Registration Proposal, supra note 8, at 10,910 ("The
information might describe, for example, whether an equity fund
emphasizes value or growth, or blends the two approaches, or whether
the fund invests in stocks based on a 'top-down' analysis of economic
trends or a 'bottom-up' analysis that focuses on the financial condition
and competitiveness of individual companies."); at 10,902 (requiring
fund to disclose whether it intends to concentrate on particular kinds of
securities and/or on industry or group of industries). See also Final
Registration Release supra note 8, at 13,920.
51 See Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,919,
13,948-13,949; Registration Proposal, supra note 8, at 10,903. A fund
must also present the best and worst returns for a quarter during this
ten-year period so as to indicate the extreme range of volatility in a
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investor to think about the relationship between risk and
return in a fund (that is, that a greater return comes with
greater volatility) and the appropriateness of such an
investment given his or her risk profile. A fund must also
provide disclosure relating to the kinds and amounts of
mutual fund fees (a subject attracting increasing
regulatory attention 52), which includes a standardized
example showing the accumulated costs of a fund for one-,
three-, five- and ten-year intervals. 53 This presentation
allows investors to compare funds on the important issue
of their costs, as well as their performance. 54
Indeed, the prominence that educationally important
information receives in a profile can almost cause a fund to
conduct some investor education itself. In discussing a
fund's risks, a fund may, but is not required to, identify
the kind of investor for which it is suitable, depending
upon the investor's risk tolerance and preferences. 55 A
fund. See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,977; see also
Registration Proposal, supra note 8, at 10,911 & n. 136 (explaining that
fund companies disagreed about appropriate quantitative risk
measurement standards and about the ability of consumers to
understand and to use effectively quantitative risk measurement, which
led the SEC not to impose any such risk disclosure requirements). This
Article does not discuss the technicalities of retum/risk presentation
(e.g., for funds with a shorter than ten-year life).52 See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Remarks at the Investment Company
Institute 3-4 (May 15, 1998), available at <http://www.sec.
gov/news/speeches/spch2l2.txt>; Pension and Welfare Benefit
Administration, Study of 401 (k) Plan Fees and Expenses (Apr. 13, 1998).5 3 See Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,949-13,95 1.
54 The other profile items involve disclosure relating to (i) a fund's
investment adviser, (ii) the purchase of fund shares, (iii) the sale of fund
shares, (iv) fund distributions and their taxation and (v) other fund
services. See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,986.
55 See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,975-13,976; Final
Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,921. The original proposal
required that funds identify appropriate investors. See Registration
Proposal, supra note 8, at 10,903 (providing that risk section would
include disclosure of types of investors for whom the fund may be
appropriate). In response to opposition by commenters who thought
that the requirement would conflict with suitability rules imposed on
brokers and investment professionals (Le., that brokers must determine
whether an investment is suitable for a client), the SEC made
identification optional in the new registration form and profile (although
it encouraged funds to make the identification).
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fund company cannot do this disclosure properly without
educating an investor about asset-allocation and life-cycle
decision-making. A growth fund may explain that its
"ideal" investor has a long-term investment horizon and no
immediate need for funds and may additionally point out
that this investor is typically a younger person with years
of future earning potential who has no near-term need of
funds from investment return (echoing life-cycle asset
allocation that would tell such a person to weight his or
her portfolio heavily toward growth stocks). A risk
disclosure requirement that a fund's bar chart of
risk/return information compare the fund's annual
returns for one-, five- and ten-year intervals to those of an
appropriate market index encourages56  investors to
compare a fund's performance to that of other funds and
particularly to a market index. If a particular fund is
actively managed, this comparison, together with the
cumulative cost disclosure, invites an investor to consider
whether investing in the fund would be better or worse
than following a passive indexing investing strategy.57
56 See Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,922-13,924.
57 See, e.g., MALKIEL, supra note 4, at 422-32 (describing benefits of
index strategy); at 441-46 (addressing why some money managers
consistently outperform market indices). The SEC proposal regarding
investment company names may have even a more basic educational
effect when used in conjunction with the profile because it will protect
an investor's application of educational principles to fund investing.
This proposal, promulgated pursuant to the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, which amended Section 35(d) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 to empower the SEC to address
deceptive or misleading company names by its rule-making authority,
see National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-290, § 208, 110 Stat. 3416, 3432 (1996), would require that a
fund invest at least 80% of its assets in a specific kind or kinds of
securities if its name suggests a fund focus on them (the SEC currently
takes the position that a fund invest 65% of its assets in securities of
the kind indicated by the fund's name). See Names Proposal, supra note
8, at 10,956. In the proposal, the SEC explains that consumers
increasingly use investment companies to meet their retirement and
other investment needs and base their fund investments on asset-
allocation theory-a primary component of investor education. See id.
at 10,956-10,957. In allocating their money, they use well-defined
kinds of funds, such as stock, bond and money market funds, to meet
their target portfolio composition. Yet, in the SEC's view, investors rely
too much on fund names. See id. at 10,956. Therefore, if a mutual fund
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IV. FURTHER EDUCATIONAL POSSIBILITIES
FOR THE PROFILE
The investor education features of the profile initiative
help ordinary investors, particularly regarding mutual
fund investing. Yet the SEC should expand this initiative,
partly by having funds encourage investors, by means of
profile items, to pay more attention to the basics of
investing. More importantly, the SEC should allow, and
even consider requiring, fund companies expressly to link
profiles to educational materials developed by them, or by
industry or nonprofit organizations. This link will further
stimulate an investor to consider, and to integrate into his
or her decision-making, the important educational issues
so essential to optimal investing. To do this, the SEC must
explicitly recognize (as it is starting to do) the importance
and value of educational products and services of private
organizations.
With an appropriate change to the rule governing the
profile, a mutual fund company could conduct more
education in the profile itself (or in the fund prospectus).
For example, a fund company could explain how a
particular fund would fit into an asset-allocation strategy
and what, in fact, this strategy means. Although a possible
problem with this approach is that it forces a company to
spend too much time hypothesizing about the identity of
the typical investor and his or her need for information and
education, the current regulatory solution in fund
disclosure, which is sensible, is to design disclosure for an
investor who has little training or sophistication in
investing.58 The main difficulty with putting education in
the profile is that it would threaten to expand the profile,
and even a full prospectus, beyond its intended scope. The
profile is designed to be a short document (or "virtual"
implies through its name that it specializes in particular investments,
but does not in fact do so, it undermines the beneficial effects of
investor education.
58See Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,919 ("Funds
should limit disclosure in prospectuses generally to information that is
necessary for an average or typical investor to make an investment
decision.").
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document) that provides only the basic information (that
is, the nine items stipulated by the profile rule) that an
investor needs to make an investment decision, which
involves comparing funds on performance and costs. The
profile must, therefore, be kept short because investors are
reluctant to read a lengthy document (as the Names
Proposal implies, they often read only the name of a
fund!) .9
The SEC could, however, enhance the educational focus
or compatibility with investor education of some profile
disclosure items. A good example, as discussed above, is
that a fund indicate the kind of investor for which it is
appropriate. This reference, which need not be long, can
convey the information to which an investor could apply
the basic asset-allocation, life-cycle strategy that he or she
should have learned in an investor education program, or
at least alert an investor to find out about this strategy.
Indeed, profiles presenting a family of funds for different
stages in a life cycle would be particularly useful places to
include this discussion because they could key funds to
different kinds of investors. 60 In allowing fund companies
to present multiple funds in a profile, the SEC thus
enables the presentation of information that truly invites
the investor to apply the life-cycle perspective. 61 Even
without an explicit SEC requirement (and without
59 See Names Proposal, supra note 8, at 10,956 ("Congress reaffirmed
its concern that investors may focus on an investment company's name
to determine the company's investments and risks ... ".
6 There is, for example, Vanguard's LifeStrategy Portfolios, designed
for different life-cycle stages. See THE VANGUARD GROUP, VANGUARD
LIFESTRATEGY PORTFOLIOS: ANNUAL REPORT (Dec. 31, 1997). Such
educational aid might not be of use to everybody and would hardly
substitute for a broker or financial planner who could assess an
individual's total financial position and recommend appropriate
investments to create an optimal portfolio. If, however, an investor is
following a simple life-cycle asset-allocation model and has few
investment assets other than his or her portfolio, it would be of use to
him or her to know where a fund would fit into a typical portfolio.
61 See Final Profile Release, supra note 7, at 13,973 ('The Commission
believes that the ability to describe different investment options in one
summary document will enable funds to develop profiles that help
investors compare investment alternatives offered by a fund group.").
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undermining broker suitability requirements),62 it makes
sense for fund companies to give some indication to
prospective buyers about who is a suitable investor for a
particular fund.
A fund company should not have to do more investor
education in the profile itself, other than what is suggested
above, because the company is likely already providing
such education, directly or indirectly through an
organization like the ICI, outside the profile. It would thus
be unnecessary to require a fund company to repeat its
educational product in each of its profiles. Yet this
coexistence of educational services with the profile (and, in
the case of products available on a fund's web site, the
"virtual" proximity of these services to the profile)63 points
to the most significant improvement to the profile initiative
that the SEC could make by further amendment to its new
profile rule. The profile format invites an ordinary investor
to apply a basic investing education to the standardized
fund information; the fund company has extensive
materials and services providing this education. The
obvious need is to link the two together.
The SEC should thus take the additional regulatory step
of allowing-perhaps even requiring-a mutual fund to
link the profile to investor education materials supplied by
the fund or by some other financial intermediary or
organization. By connecting a profile to educational
materials, a fund company would drive home to an
ordinary investor that he or she needs the education to
make more sense of the simplified fund information and to
invest optimally. In fact, linkage between the information
and education would work particularly well electronically,
which is how many ordinary individuals are increasingly
62 See generally NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION
2-1 to 2-110 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing fiduciary obligations of brokers).
63 See, e.g., Fidelity Investments: Know what you own and
know why you own it, (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.fidelity.com/
planning/investment> (providing online service where individual
account information co-exists with educational information and access
is a mouse-click away).
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investing.64 In such cases, the linkage would occur
throughout a profile: when, for example, a fund discusses
its risks and identifies the appropriate kind of investor for
the fund, it could point the investor by a hypertext link
specifically to educational materials on risk, asset
allocation and life-cycle investing.65 Even if an investor
relies on a written profile, a fund could accompany it with
a basic investor education booklet to which the profle
could be cross-referenced, just as funds now send an
investor a handbook on fund services to accompany a
profile or a prospectus.66
With industry consultation, the SEC must work out the
details of the linkage, which means that it would need to
submit an amending rule proposal regarding the profile
and the new prospectus format.67 An obvious concern
would be how to introduce an investor to the need for
education and to provide cross-references without adding
to the size or complexity of the profile. The SEC would have
6 See YANKELOVICH PARTNERS INC., 1997 ANNUAL SIA INVESTOR SURVEY:
INVESTORS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 12 (Nov. 1997)
(referring to growing numbers of investors who use personal computers
to obtain investment information and to trade).
65 In all its disclosure simplification initiatives, the SEC worries about
confusing a consumer by providing cross-references. Yet the electronic
delivery of disclosure documents and educational materials, with their
hypertext links, ensures that the use of cross-references does not
impede reading and comprehension, because a reader can access them
so easily and then return without difficulty to the main document.
6 Funds now send investors such educational booklets. See, e.g.,
CHARLES SCHWAB, THE ESSENTIAL INVESTOR (1997); FIDELITY INVESTMENTS,
MANAGING RISK IN YOUR PORTFOLIO: A FIDELITY GUIDE FOR EXPERIENCED
INVESTORS (1995) (describing risk, risk management and asset
allocation); MERRILL LYNCH, YOU AND YOUR MONEY: A FINANCIAL HANDBOOK
FOR WOMEN INVESTORS (1997): THE VANGUARD GROUP, THE VANGUARD
INVESTMENT PLANNER: A GUIDE TO ASSET ALLOCATION (1996). The SEC
understands and accepts that a fund might send a handbook that
supplies information about multiple funds together with a profile or
prospectus. See Final Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,954
(explaining how fund can separate out fund purchase and redemption
information in separate document, incorporate it by reference in
prospectus and distribute it to investors).
67 The SEC might also issue a concept release on investor education.
See Fanto, supra note 6. The SEC could make this proposal regarding
the linkage in its concept release.
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to draft a simple legend, in "plain English," to be placed at
the beginning of the profile, that encouraged investors to
use a company's educational materials and services, and it
would also have to identify the key items, and appropriate
language, for educational cross-references. The logical
items for such cross-reference are those involving a fund's
objectives, strategies, risks and returns, and fees (the first
four profile items). In addition, the SEC will want a fund to
make some reference to the SEC's own anti-fraud
education materials and to the availability of education
providers unaffiliated with the fund. One possible legend
incorporating all such educational references would be the
following:
You should decide whether an investment in the [fund]
is suitable to your personal circumstances and fits with
your other investments. For help in making this
decision, you should consult your broker or financial
advisor, if you have one, and the investor education
materials of [fund company], which are available at
[provide reference/web site link] and to which this
profile will occasionally refer. The Securities and
Exchange Commission will also direct you to other
education providers, as well as help you protect yourself
against investment fraud and abuse (please call
[telephone number] or go to the Commission's Internet
site, www.sec.gov).68
And the SEC would have to consider providing companies
with a "safe harbor" from any liability for the educational
6 The new disclosure format has reduced the "clutter" of legends and
cross-references in the fund prospectus, but still provides for some
general ones pointing investors to other documents. See, e.g., Final
Registration Release, supra note 8, at 13,948 (providing legends that
refer investors outside prospectus to fund's annual and semi-annual
reports, Statements of Additional Information and even to SEC web
site). If a fund company does not provide educational services, it could
link its disclosure documents to the services of the ICI or of the
brokerage firms through which the fund is sold. Cf., il. (allowing a fund
sold through a broker to indicate that further information about the
fund is available with the broker or another financial intermediary).
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materials, for fund companies would be reluctant to make
educational references if it enhanced their liability risks.6
9
The SEC has begun to recognize the value of private
educational services provided by fund companies.7
0
Additional profile reform in line with the above suggestion
could be a significant opportunity for the SEC publicly to
acknowledge the developments in investor education by
financial firms and nonprofit organizations and to
encourage consumers to use these educational services.
As such, the reform would fit well in the national campaign
relating to investor education on pension investing and the
SEC's own recent efforts to improve the position of
ordinary investors in the securities markets.
V. CONCLUSION
The current focus on investor education is necessary in
this country as individuals bear the responsibility for their
retirement future through their own saving and investing.
It is not known how much education will improve the
investing performance of ordinary investors, and
educational efforts should not foreclose other ways of
helping Americans (particularly those with lower incomes)
prepare for retirement. If, however, education is not
effective, the consequences may indeed be grim, as wealth
disparities increase through generations and as other,
more politically charged solutions might be needed to
address the plight of the elderly in retirement. Moreover,
69 Cf., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10)(a) (1997) (exempting supplementary
sales literature from the prospectus definition); 17 C.F.R. § 230.135a
(1998) (providing that generic advertising for mutual funds will not be
deemed to offer security for sale when certain conditions are met). The
most sensible approach might well be to exempt educational materials
from the definition of a prospectus.70 See Levitt, supra note 36, at 2 (praising publicly the educational
activities of private firms); Rachel Witmar, SEC Wants Mutual Funds
Voluntarily To Disclose Risk, Fee Data, Barbash Confirms, 30 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. 1006, 1007 (No. 27, July 3, 1998) (reporting that then SEC
Director of Investment Management Barry Barbash (as well as Mike
Miller of Vanguard) "focused on the need to educate investors beyond
the prospectus and other official fund documents, through brochures,
the Internet, and the media").
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the need for investor education for the ordinary investor is
a salutary reminder to those who focus exclusively on
institutions in the securities markets and on pension fund
capitalism. 71 Behind those institutions stand ordinary
investors who place money in a 401(k) plan, an individual
retirement account or a brokerage account and must
decide how to invest it. If such investors lose confidence in
the markets, the impact could be tremendous.
Financial regulators like the SEC have, therefore, no
choice but to consider investor education in all of their
regulations affecting ordinary investors, even if it presents
new challenges to them. This Article argues that, in its
profile initiative, the SEC exhibits the appropriate
educational focus by adopting a simplified format, the
profile, for presenting fund information, by encouraging
fund companies to conduct some education in their profile
disclosure, and, most importantly, by having them present
information that invites the investor to apply to it investor
education principles. Because so many fund companies,
fund organizations, nonprofit groups and even the SEC
itself now provide educational materials and services, the
SEC should simply take the next step and facilitate the
connection between the profile and these educational
materials. To do so would promote the education that
ordinary investors so desperately need.
71 See, e.g., MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY
MANAGERS ARE CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA (1996) (in a
discussion of the relations between public corporations and their
shareholders he all but dismisses the ordinary investor).
